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The COVID-19 pandemic is revealing its severe implications not just for 
health systems worldwide. One striking political consequence has been 
renewed power concentration in the executive. There are signs of a global 
increase in this executive personalisation having occurred over the last 12 
months.
 • Personalisation of executive political power is a process in which the chief ex-
ecutive’s discretionary power over political decisions increases at the expense 
of other political actors. Increased personalisation may undermine the provi-
sion of public goods including healthcare, increase corruption, and threaten 
regime stability.
 • Even before the pandemic, there was a trend across world regions towards 
the expansion of executive political power, manifesting itself in the erosion of 
vertical and diagonal constraints on governmental power. These trends were 
particularly pronounced in Latin America, and in the Middle East and North 
Africa.
 • In Brazil and Mexico, presidents have used their already extensive authority 
to centralise decision-making and thus imprint their views on the pandemic’s 
handling. In Egypt’s military-dominated electoral autocracy, President Ab-
del Fattah al-Sisi has fortified his personal grip on power during the course 
of COVID-19’s spread. In Israel, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu – under 
indictment for bribery and fraud – has managed to stay in power and to delay 
conviction partly due to the pandemic.
Policy Implications
Executive personalisation has taken new twists and turns under the COVID-19 
pandemic that may have detrimental political effects in the medium- to long-
term, with or without major regime transformation. European and German pol-
icymakers should update their existing monitoring instruments to react to these 
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COVID-19 and the Personalisation of Executive Power
When the COVID-19 pandemic began to spread in February 2020, leaders around 
the world were forced to grapple with it so as to limit its effects. Most of them issued 
stay-at-home orders or imposed lockdowns, quarantines, curfews, and restrictions 
on movement. Public gatherings, including elections, were delayed or cancelled, 
limits to freedoms of assembly, association, and speech were imposed, and demo-
cratic institutions were constrained in their work. Although many of these measures 
conformed to expert recommendations on containing the virus, they also provided 
chief executives with a window of opportunity to bolster their own power. 
Conceptualising the Personalisation of Executive Power
While not every chief executive made international headlines, there are signs of 
a global increase in executive personalisation. This is particularly the case across 
countries in Asia-Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA), and of sub-Saharan Africa. We define the personalisa-
tion of executive political power as a process in which the chief executive’s dis-
cretionary power over political decisions increases at the expense of that of other 
political actors. This definition contains three constitutive elements: (1) the chief 
executive; (2) the idea of an increase in discretionary power; and, (3) the question 
of who other relevant political actors or organisations are.
1. The chief executive: Whether they are called presidents, prime ministers, kings, 
or heads of a military council, chief executives are those holding the most im-
portant political position in a given country. Importantly, the (individual) chief 
executive differs from (collective) executive power, meaning the ministers, 
aides, and advisors, in that the latter operate under the former’s direct author-
ity and their power may be subject to the chief executive’s discretion. 
2. Increases in discretionary power: We understand discretionary power as the 
chief executive’s ability to influence political decisions without being con-
strained by other political actors. Often, actions of personalisation are subtle, 
do not appear as part of formal institutional changes, and are thus difficult to 
trace and label. These include the circumvention of existing decision-making 
structures, the appointment of loyalists to key state positions, in addition to the 
outright changing of institutional rules (Slater 2003).
3. Other political actors: These are the organisations and individuals that either 
formally or informally have a say in the political decision-making process. Who 
they are depends on the specific characteristics of the political system at hand. 
In democracies, these include the formal political institutions of the executive, 
legislative, and judicial branches, but also political organisations, parties, and 
lobbying groups. In autocracies, these might be the central committees of rul-
ing parties, powerful businesspeople, or the military leadership.
It is crucial to note that such personalisation can occur in any type of political sys-
tem and from any existing degree of personalised executive power: that is, it is 
not the same as deinstitutionalisation or autocratisation. In other words, it does 
not equate to a decline in the institutional requirements for electoral democracy. 
While personalisation undermines the checks and balances that the chief executive 
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faces, it does not necessarily lead to threats to the electoral rules’ very existence. 
Similarly, not all autocracies are highly personalised, as strict forms of collective 
leadership provide effective constraints on the chief executive in military juntas 
and party regimes. Finally, the results of the process of personalisation of executive 
power might be long-lasting or rather short-lived, depending on the institutional 
and structural contexts as well as on the ability of other actors to undo changes 
made by personalising leaders.
Changing Constraints on Executive Power 
Worries about the accumulation of political power in the hands of the executive had 
been voiced long before the current pandemic struck. At least since the middle of 
the first decade of the new century, post-Cold War optimism about the victory of lib-
eral democracy had been supplanted by warnings of an end to the most recent wave 
of democratisation, the stagnation of democratic development in many recently de-
mocratised countries, and the return of authoritarianism. One typical aspect of this 
alleged crisis of democracy is the erosion of mechanisms that constrain the power of 
the executive, and thus lead to the expansion of the chief executive’s discretionary 
power over political decisions. Existing literature conceptualises constraints on ex-
ecutive power per three dimensions: vertical, horizontal, and diagonal (Lührmann, 
Marquardt, and Mechkova 2020). 
 • Vertical constraints refer to the mechanisms that ensure citizens can control 
the executive through regular, free, and fair elections. Consequently, all at-
tempts at manipulating elections – such as gerrymandering, changing of voting 
rights, and outright vote-rigging – lead to an erosion of vertical constraints on 
executive power. 
 • Horizontal constraints describe the institutional checks and balances through 
which the other constitutional powers of government, namely the legislature 
and the judiciary, limit the discretionary power of the executive (O’Donnell 
1994). Chief executives’ intentions in accumulating power often undermine 
horizontal constraints on their discretionary power. This is achieved by ex-
panding their grip on decision-making bodies such as the legislature or the rul-
ing parties, and by curtailing the autonomy of the judiciary. 
 • Diagonal constraints include the checks on executive discretionary power from 
non-state actors, especially civil society organisations and the media. Attempts 
by the chief executive to reduce diagonal constraints on their power include at-
tacks on media freedoms and bans on civil society activism.
Drawing on the most recent available data from the Varieties of Democracy (V-
Dem) project (Coppedge et al. 2020), Figure 1 below shows the development of re-
gional averages across the four world regions in the three dimensions of constraints 
on executive power. This is done for the period 2005 to 2019, the latter being the 
last year for which data is available.[1] All three variables range between 0 and 1, 
with 0 indicating the lowest and 1 the highest possible level of constraints. The 
graphs indicate that not all dimensions were equally subject to an erosion of execu-
tive constraints and that there are considerable differences across regions – but also 
important dynamics and changes within the regions occurred over time too.
1 The V-Dem project uses 
the term “accountability” to 
describe what we consider 
constraints on executive 
power: “Accountability is 
understood as constraints 
on the government’s use of 
political power through re-
quirements for justification 
for its actions and potential 
sanctions” (Coppedge et 
al. 2020: 268). For ease of 
understanding and con-
tinuity, we adhere to the 
term “constraints” when 
referring to the V-Dem ac-
countability indicators.
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The right-hand graph in Figure 1 shows a coherent trend across all four regions 
of declining diagonal constraints. In terms of vertical and horizontal constraints, 
meanwhile, there are considerable regional differences. The countries in LAC start-
ed out with the strongest limitations on executive power but saw a marked decline 
in all three dimensions. The developments in Asia-Pacific and sub-Saharan Africa 
are less pronounced. Vertical and horizontal limits on executive power were, on 
average, strengthened across the Asia-Pacific region, while sub-Saharan Africa saw 
a net decline in the vertical and a slight net increase in the horizontal dimension.
The MENA saw the most drastic changes, and the graphs clearly show the 
impact of the political liberalisation in many of the region’s countries during the 
2010/11 Arab Uprisings and the subsequent return of authoritarianism across all 
three dimensions. While vertical and horizontal limitations on chief executives’ 
power have net increased in the MENA region if we compare the pre-Arab Spring 
period with the situation in 2019, the downwards trend is clear. Given these re-
gional patterns, it is worthwhile to discuss whether and how chief executives in LAC 
and the MENA – the regions with the highest and lowest overall degree of executive 
constraints as well as with the most pronounced changes, respectively – used the 
window of opportunity that the COVID-19 pandemic provided to further increase 
their discretionary power. 
Executive Personalisation in LAC and MENA
By the time the current pandemic began, LAC and the MENA had already seen 
considerable erosions in the constraints on executive power. Moreover, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that the pandemic indeed constituted a convenient moment for 
chief executives to further personalise their power in at least some cases. Evidence 
from Brazil, Egypt, Israel, and Mexico shows how subtle and diverse these changes 
in the discretionary power of presidents and prime ministers have been.
Figure 1




tion, based on data from 
Coppedge et al. (2020).
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Executive Personalisation in LAC
In Mexico, as in other LAC countries, people were angry with inadequate national 
responses to inequality, poverty, insecurity, corruption, poor state performance, 
and other governance failures. In 2018, voters had brought Andrés Manuel López 
Obrador (AMLO) to the presidency: a seasoned left-wing politician who staged 
himself as an anti-establishment figure. AMLO’s project was personalistic from the 
outset. He won by a landslide, promising a complete rupture with the established 
order – which he characterised as one of moral decline. His task was to “put the 
poor first,” and to rid the state of fraud and corruption. He ran under the banner of 
the National Regeneration Movement (MORENA), the party he had created in 2014 
from other parties and unorganised popular constituencies. MORENA obtained 
control of the federal congress and several governorships, but remained dependent 
on AMLO’s charismatic leadership, thus indicating weak legislative constraints on 
the chief executive. 
In his fight against corruption, AMLO claimed “republican austerity” and ag-
gressively cut state budgets – which included massive lay-offs of public-health 
personnel and the dismantling of traditional social programmes. Discarding old 
institutions did not mean engaging in institution-building however, but a tight 
centralisation of expenditure to the presidency and the erection of parallel struc-
tures under the latter’s authority – such as the coordination of social plans and 
other programmes, and the appointment of presidential delegates to the federal 
states (Sánchez Talanquer 2020). While the state shrank and centralised, the armed 
forces increased their own power. They did so in an unprecedented manner and 
well beyond their already-extensive previous role, for instance by expanding their 
participation in internal-security tasks after the dissolution of the Federal Police, as 
well as in other political and economic matters (Pérez Correa 2020). 
When the pandemic hit Mexico, the chronically deficient public-healthcare sys-
tem was suffering under a severe cost-cutting scheme, the administration was be-
ing centralised, and national security was becoming increasingly militarised. The 
left-wing president did not change his stance much while facing the hardships of 
the pandemic. His reluctance to spend money surprised everyone, including the 
International Monetary Fund, which recommended to increase social outputs. 
From the start, AMLO followed a vague and incoherent laissez-faire approach to 
the crisis, avoiding committing to social-distancing measures. When the president 
caught COVID-19 in January 2021, by when Mexico had reached third place glob-
ally in absolute numbers of deaths, AMLO continued appealing to people’s faith 
and personal strength as remedies. While in quarantine, he stated that worse than 
the pandemic was “the plague of corruption.” Corresponding to his direct appeal to 
the people and the political needs of his party in an electoral year, he has person-
ally promoted vaccination. Yet the government’s vaccination scheme has, as with 
AMLO’s other social programmes, been criticised for its unconventional and per-
sonalistic design, raising concerns of its potentially clientelist use in an electoral 
year – when the president should instead be rendered accountable. AMLO had only 
a mild version of COVID-19 as it happened, yet his temporary separation from the 
tasks of government still highlighted the uncertainty and fragility embedded in a 
strongly personalist project.
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Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro – a former army captain, long-term backbencher in the 
Brazilian Congress, and open defender of past dictatorships and far-right values – 
won the presidency in 2018. As with AMLO in Mexico, Bolsonaro promised to crush 
political corruption and crime. He would also renew Brazilian politics by undoing 
the left’s legacies inherited from the Workers’ Party presidencies. Once in power 
he left his own small party and refused to form a coalition to work with Congress, 
recruiting mainly technocrats, military officers, and radical politicians to executive 
positions. Sometimes referred to as “the tropical Trump,” Bolsonaro’s negation-
ist and anti-scientific approach to the pandemic has repeatedly made international 
headlines. He initially faced it by deepening social polarisation and using incendi-
ary rhetoric against democratic institutions – Congress, the judiciary, local govern-
ments – that contradicted his views (Bülow und Llanos 2020). 
The Federal Supreme Tribunal threatened Bolsonaro with investigation, Con-
gress with impeachment – which eventually pushed him to tone down his rhetoric 
and seek cooperation with the latter. Yet Bolsonaro did not change his views on the 
pandemic. Accordingly, he used appointments and other administrative measures 
to centralise COVID-19-related decisions and agencies, including the health min-
istry, under his direct authority (Inácio, Santana, and Mendes da Rocha forthcom-
ing). At the beginning of the pandemic, Bolsonaro dismissed two health ministers 
for contradicting his recommendation of unproven remedies such a hydroxychloro-
quine and his opposition to social distancing. The health portfolio eventually went 
to an active army general without prior healthcare experience who aligned with the 
president’s views and appointed a military team that reversed previous decisions 
to contain the virus. Such inaction on part of the federal government severely un-
dermined the state’s public-health capabilities, despite the engagement of subna-
tional authorities, federal legislators, and courts to guarantee and implement health 
measures and social policies. 
In January 2021, a death toll exceeding 212,000 people and a succession of 
scandals – such as the shortage of oxygen and a consequent surge of deaths in 
Manaus – closely pointed to the president’s and his ministers’ errors. Revived calls 
for impeachment prompted Bolsonaro to tighten his leverage in Congress by secur-
ing the presidencies of the two chambers, which he managed with generous hand-
ing out of pork funds and ministerial positions, in open contradiction of his anti-
political electoral promises. This move may protect the president’s agenda, while 
reducing horizontal controls on his performance. In parallel, the recent launch of 
the vaccination process – being in the hands of the governor of São Paulo, a politi-
cal rival of the president – may dissipate urgent concerns about the pandemic and 
further help the president to survive politically. 
Executive Personalisation in the MENA
In Egypt, notions of personalisation would be key features of regime consolidation 
after the Arab Uprisings as part of a military dictatorship with Abdel Fattah al-Sisi 
as the president at its helm. After the abdication of President Hosni Mubarak in 
February 2011 due to widespread mass protest, the country was formally ruled by 
the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) until Mohamed Morsi, an Islam-
ist leader and former member of the Muslim Brotherhood, became Egypt’s first 
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freely elected president in June 2012. Within a year, however, Morsi was ousted 
by the military. Followed by another period of SCAF rule and after a period of un-
precedented state repression and violence, in June 2014 the new strong man, Sisi, 
became the current president.
While Sisi, a former general and head of military intelligence, has relied on a 
personality cult and the strategic positioning of family members within the intel-
ligence services and state bureaucracy, his rise and consolidation of power at the 
top of the Egyptian state signifies above all the structural ascent of the military not 
only within the country’s economy but increasingly also in other sectors of social 
and political life too (Sayigh 2019). Legislative changes implemented during the 
current pandemic exemplify evidence for both the further advancing of militarisa-
tion as well as for executive personalisation at the top of the system. After initial 
denial, Sisi reacted vigorously to the spread of the virus under a state of emergency 
– which predates the pandemic, being ongoing since 2017 – by closing schools and 
universities and providing financial means for a COVID-19 prevention strategy. 
Subsequently, the president delegated the daily management of the pandemic to 
the cabinet – which thereafter implemented a partial lockdown, combined with a 
campaign of silencing critics of its policies. 
In May 2020, in a more enduring formal change, the Egyptian Emergency Law 
was amended. Officially justified as a way to improve the effectiveness of public-
health management, only 5 of the 18 amendments were actually tied to health is-
sues. The rest provided the president with new tools to expand his power, for in-
stance by allowing him to restrict all public protest and gatherings, to control the 
prices of goods and services, and to broaden the jurisdiction of military courts by 
ordering military prosecution if any of the law’s provisions are violated (Human 
Rights Watch 2020). In July 2020, the Armed Forces Officers’ Service and Promo-
tion Law was amended, stipulating that all military personnel who want to run for 
election at any level need SCAF approval (AFP 2020). The latter is a superordinate 
military institution headed by Sisi that has ruled twice within the last 10 years after 
the demise of Presidents Mubarak and Morsi.
Israel is the only country in the MENA with regular, fair, and free elections. Yet 
the country has seen an incremental enhancement of the chief executive’s power 
already since the 1980s (Balmas et al. 2014). This process reached its peak during 
the late 1990s, a period in which Israel experimented with the direct election of its 
prime minister (notwithstanding its unique parliamentary system). This attempt 
was terminated in the early years of the new century since none of the expected 
stabilisation could be achieved – that due to the pertinacious fragmentation of Is-
rael’s party system. In 2001, Israel therefore returned to a system through which 
the prime minister, as chief executive, is elected indirectly by the country’s parlia-
ment, the Knesset.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, a specific notion of executive personalisation 
has emerged. Benjamin Netanyahu, the current prime minister who is under indict-
ment for three cases of bribery and fraud, is at the centre of this following key pre-
pandemic moments. First, parliamentary elections in April and September 2019 
failed to deliver clear majorities in the Knesset. When attempts to form a govern-
ment failed in December 2019 – partly due to parties on the left refusing to coop-
erate with Netanyahu, as a person under investigation for corruption – new elec-
tions were scheduled for 2 March 2020. Second, criminal investigations have been 
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ongoing against Netanyahu since around 2017. Following his formal indictment in 
November 2019 by the attorney general, the prime minister was forced to relinquish 
the four ministerial posts he held at that time – but did not give up the premiership. 
Netanyahu’s reaction culminated in a tirade against the country’s judiciary, police, 
and media, who he accused of plotting against the will of the people. Meanwhile 
parliamentary elections took place as scheduled on 2 March 2020 – which again 
did not produce a clear majority for any party, and the first trial against Netanyahu 
was set for March 17.
In parallel, Israel was hit by the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. Netan-
yahu as acting prime minister issued a series of executive orders at that time which 
prevented the newly elected parliament from convening and also shutdown courts. 
“Likewise, the courts shutdown also was approved in the middle of the night by 
Netanyahu’s hand-picked justice minister, just a day before the prime minister’s 
criminal trial was to begin. The decree, citing the coronavirus, postponed the trial 
until May” (Heller 2020). This gave Netanyahu time to finish a power-sharing deal 
with his main opponent Benny Gantz – leader of the center-left “Blue and White” 
alliance – a few weeks later in April. With that, Netanyahu – who is the long-term 
leader of the right-wing Likud party – not only managed to divide the Blue and 
White alliance in the Knesset but also gained control over the appointment of Su-
preme Court judges – as well as a right to veto the appointments of the next attor-
ney general and the head of the prosecution too. 
This power-sharing deal would have been unimaginable without the pandemic, 
as Gantz only agreed to it to keep Israel governable during the deepening COVID-19 
crisis. Moreover, the deal allowed Netanyahu to extend his premiership into a 12th 
consecutive year and granted him the necessary leverage to influence any final legal 
verdict against him. However, the Israeli version of executive personalisation dur-
ing the pandemic is still ongoing, as the current coalition broke down in December 
2020 and new parliamentary elections have been scheduled to take place on 23 
March 2021. As a recent report by the newspaper Haaretz indicates, Netanyahu has 
already started manoeuvres to delay the evidentiary sessions of the court trial until 
after the next elections. Should he win, his supporters within the Knesset could 
pass a new law granting him immunity until the end of his time in office and even 
allowing him to influence who will become the next Israeli president – a person who 
eventually could pardon him if necessary (Levinson 2021). 
Consequences and Policy Implications 
The chief executives in the four examples given have tested the limits of power 
well beyond their rhetorical attacks on opposing actors and institutions during the 
current pandemic. Mexico’s and Brazil’s presidents have become famous for their 
inaction in the fight against COVID-19. However they have been actually quite ac-
tive and skillful in the use of their vast executive powers to circumvent established 
bureaucracies and political opponents. Where they faced horizontal constitutional 
constraints, AMLO and Bolsonaro found ways to circumvent them to get what they 
wanted. The policy consequences of these manoeuvres have been severe – as health 
and economic indicators show – in the short run. They may be even more negative 
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in the medium- to long term – particularly, through the active involvement of the 
military in political affairs.
In fact, the four examples reveal erosion in all three dimensions of executive 
constraints, though not all of them in each of the cases. For Egypt, the pandemic 
has been a catalyst for the actions of a leader of an already highly repressive and 
militarised authoritarian regime – one in which vertical and diagonal executive 
constraints were already very low – serving to further tighten the leash. Horizontal 
constraints were removed by the placing of emergency authority in the hands of the 
president. By limiting the capabilities of media and civil society activists to monitor 
and challenge the military’s conduct, the changes to the emergency provisions also 
limit the diagonal constraints on the executive. Finally, despite further expanding 
the military’s internal-security role, Sisi has weakened the military’s institutional 
ability to act as an independent horizontal or vertical constraint on his discretion-
ary power. It is now easier for him to formally select loyalists from among the mili-
tary and filter out those Egyptian generals that could be a threat at the ballot box. 
In Israel, executive personalisation was neither caused by, nor did it lead to, 
institutional change or the formal abolition of horizontal constraints. Nonetheless, 
Netanyahu masterfully exploited existing institutional weaknesses and utilised the 
discretionary power of his office to effectively shield himself from legal prosecution. 
The pandemic was an asset in this as it forced other political actors such as Gantz 
to play along so as to ensure the government’s effectiveness in light of a national 
health crisis. These findings reiterate that the personalisation of executive power 
and the erosion of constraints are nothing new, and certainly not the result of the 
global coronavirus crisis; the pandemic has provided a new opportunity for execu-
tive aggrandisement, however.
In terms of future prospects, we do not expect significant change in the short- to 
medium term. In light of slow vaccination rates – Israel being a rare counterexam-
ple – and the emergence of more infectious variants of the virus, the exceptional 
situation which grants chief executives the window of opportunity for expanding 
their discretionary power is likely to be with us for some time. In 2021, elections 
are scheduled to take place in Israel and Mexico, which provides a chance for voters 
to hold the chief executive accountable – both in terms of personalising executive 
power and on their record in fighting the pandemic. However, as not only the exam-
ples of AMLO and Netanyahu show, chief executives have been able to use COVID-
19-related measures – including vaccination – for electoral gain.
Executive personalisation has taken new twists and turns during the current 
pandemic in many countries across the globe. European and German policymakers 
should be aware of these ongoing changes and monitor their consequences. Moreo-
ver, executive-power concentration is not bad per se; the success cases of New Zea-
land, South Korea, and Taiwan show that even consolidated democracies with free 
societies can design and implement effective and efficient pandemic responses if 
the government acts decisively. Power concentration becomes problematic, rather, 
if it represents an end in itself, goes beyond the current necessities, and is perpetu-
ated past the immediate crisis situation. In evaluating this potential trade-off, an 
in-depth understanding of the forms, causes, and consequences of the expansion 
of executive power is crucial, which also requires local knowledge from experts, 
media, and civil society in the countries suffering from such personalisation. For 
policymakers to design effective measures to prevent the erosion of constraints on 
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executive power and support local actors aiming to defend existing constraints, 
more precise evidence must be collected. This should also be understood as a call 
for researchers to pay attention to the phenomenon of executive personalisation 
and to closely study the impact of crises such as the current pandemic as windows 
of opportunity for the concentration of power in the hands of the chief executive.
References
AFP (2020), Egypt’s Sisi Ratifies Law Hampering Soldiers from Seeking Office, in: 
News24, 30 July, www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/egypts-sisi-ratifies-
law-hampering-soldiers-from-seeking-office-20200730 (20 January 2021).
Balmas, Meital, Gideon Rahat, Tamir Sheafer, and Shaul R. Shenhav (2014), Two 
Routes to Personalized Politics: Centralized and Decentralized Personalization, 
in: Party Politics, 20, 1, 37–51.
Bülow, Marisa von, and Mariana Llanos (2020), Brasil: Los límites y peligros de un 
presidente polarizador, in: Yanni Pettiná and Rafael Rojas (eds), América Latina. 
Del Estallido Social a la Implosión Económica y Sanitaria post COVID-19, Lima: 
Crítica, www.crisol.com.pe/libro-america-latina-estallido-social-implosion-eco 
nomica-sanitaria-post-covid19-9786124753237 (20 January 2021).
Coppedge, Michael et al. (2020), V-Dem [Country–Year/Country–Date] Dataset 
V10, Gothenburg: University of Gothenburg: Varieties of Democracy Institute, 
www.v-dem.net/en/reference/version-9-apr-2019/ (20 January 2021).
Heller, Aron (2020), Protesters Accuse Netanyahu of Exploiting Pandemic for Pow-
er Grab, in: Associated Press, 19 March, http://bit.ly/3r87Ect (18 January 2021).
Human Rights Watch (2020), Egypt: Covid-19 Cover for New Repressive Powers, 
Human Rights Watch, www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/07/egypt-covid-19-cover-
new-repressive-powers (2 February 2021).
Inácio, Magna, Luciana Santana, and Marta Mendes da Rocha (forthcoming), La 
confrontación de la pandemia de COVID-19 en Brasil: Inacción presidencial y 
descoordinación federal, in: Iberoamericana, 76.
Levinson, Chaim (2021), Netanyahu Making Progress in Bid to Cancel His Corrup-
tion Trial, in: Haaretz, 17 January, www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-
netanyahu-making-progress-in-bid-to-cancel-his-corruption-trial-1.9457766 (19 
January 2021).
Lührmann, Anna, Kyle L. Marquardt, and Valeriya Mechkova (2020), Constraining 
Governments: New Indices of Vertical, Horizontal, and Diagonal Accountability, 
in: American Political Science Review, 114, 3, 811–820.
O’Donnell, Guillermo A. (1994), Delegative Democracy, in: Journal of Democracy, 
5, 1, 55–69.
Pérez Correa, Catalina (2020), AMLO’s Broken Campaign Promise: Demilitarizing 
Mexico, in: Americas Quarterly, 9 December, www.americasquarterly.org/arti 
cle/amlos-broken-campaign-promise-demilitarizing-mexico/ (25 January 2021).
Sánchez Talanquer, Mariano (2020), Mexico 2019: Personalistic Politics and Neo-
liberalism from the Left, in: Revista de ciencia política (Santiago), 40, 2, 401–
430.
Sayigh, Yezid (2019), Owners of the Republic: An Anatomy of Egypt’s Mili-
tary Economy, Beirut: Carnegie Middle East Center, https://carnegie-mec.
   11    GIGA FOCUS | GLOBAL | NO. 2 | FEBRUARY 2021 
org/2019/11/18/owners-of-republic-anatomy-of-egypt-s-military-economy-
pub-80325 (20 January 2021).
Slater, Dan (2003), Iron Cage in an Iron Fist: Authoritarian Institutions and the 
Personalization of Power in Malaysia, in: Comparative Politics, 36, 1, 81–101.
About the Authors
Dr. David Kuehn is a senior research fellow at the GIGA Institute for Asian Studies. 
His research focuses on questions of authoritarianism and democratisation, and 




Dr. Mariana Llanos is lead research fellow at the GIGA Institute for Latin American 
Studies and has been the head of GIGA Research Programme 1 “Accountability and 
Participation” since 2015. Her research revolves around the elected executive, and 
examines under what conditions institutions constrain powerful presidents.
mariana.llanos@giga-hamburg.de, www.giga-hamburg.de/en/team/11565263-lla 
nos-mariana/
Dr. Thomas Richter is a senior research fellow at the GIGA Institute for Middle East 
Studies. His work focuses upon the role of hydrocarbon income for the survival of 




GIGA Research Programme 1 “Accountability and Participation” investigates the 
interplay between citizens, elites, and political decision-makers in dictatorships 
and democracies. Our research undertakes comparative analyses of ongoing politi-
cal processes that may foster or undermine the quality of democratic institutions. 
We analyse the spread of authoritarian politics and practices across the globe. To 
find more on GIGA's work on the coronavirus pandemic and its impact worldwide 
please go to: www.giga-hamburg.de/en/Coronavirus-and-the-Global-South
Related GIGA Publications
Blofield, Merike, Bert Hoffmann, and Mariana Llanos (2020), Assessing the Politi-
cal and Social Impact of the COVID-19 Crisis in Latin America, GIGA Focus Lat-
in America, 3, April, www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publications/18749084-assess 
ing-political-social-impact-covid-19-crisis-latin-america/.
Kuehn, David (ed.) (2019), The Military’s Impact on Democratic Development: 
Midwives or Gravediggers of Democracy?, Abingdon: Routledge.
   12    GIGA FOCUS | GLOBAL | NO. 2 | FEBRUARY 2021
Imprint
The GIGA Focus is an Open Access publication and can be read on the 
Inter net and downloaded free of charge at www.giga-hamburg.de/en/
publications/giga-focus/. According to the conditions of the Creative Com-
mons licence Attribution-No Derivative Works 3.0 this publication may be 
freely duplicated, circulated and made accessible to the public. The par-
ticular conditions include the correct indication of the initial publication as 
GIGA Focus and no changes in or abbreviation of texts.
The German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA) publishes the Focus series on 
Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and global issues. The GIGA Focus is edited 
and published by the GIGA. The views and opinions expressed are solely those of the 
authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the institute. Authors alone are responsible 
for the content of their articles. GIGA and the authors cannot be held liable for any errors 
and omissions, or for any consequences arising from the use of the information provided.
The GIGA is thankful for the institutional support provided by the Free and Hanseatic City of 
Hamburg (Ministry of Science, Research, Equalities and Districts) and the Federal Republic 
of Germany (Federal Foreign Office).
General Editor GIGA Focus Series: Prof. Dr. Sabine Kurtenbach 
Editor GIGA Focus Global: Prof. Dr. Sabine Kurtenbach
Editorial Department: Dr. James Powell, Christine Berg 
 




Llanos, Mariana, and Aníbal Pérez‐Liñán (2020), Oversight or Representation? 
Public Opinion and Impeachment Resolutions in Argentina and Brazil, in: Legis-
lative Studies Quarterly, online first, https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12281. 
Richter, Thomas (2020), New Petro-Aggression in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia 
in the Spotlight, in: Global Policy, 11, 1, 93–102, https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-
5899.12780.
Woertz, Eckart (2020), COVID-19 in the Middle East and North Africa: Reac-
tions, Vulnerabilities, Prospects, GIGA Focus Middle East, 2, April, www.giga- 
hamburg.de/en/publications/19066055-covid-19-middle-east-north-africa-
reactions-vulnerabilities-prospects/.
